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chinesischen	 Christen	 –	 positive	 Europabilder	 nach	 konfuzianischen	 Maßstäben	 bemessen	
waren.	Anfang	des	20.	Jahrhunderts	wurde	die	Relevanz	des	Konfuzianismus	im	Hinblick	auf	
Europa	nicht	mehr	vorausgesetzt,	sondern	vielmehr	kritisch	debattiert.	
In recent years, academic research has witnessed a growing interest in the history of the 
idea of “Europe” and related concepts. Case study after case study has added new facets 
to our understanding of how the concept of “Europe” varied according to specific situ-
ations and historical contexts.1 Given such an interest in this topic, however, it is rather 
surprising that research thus far mainly focused on the image of Europe in the eyes of 
Europeans.2 Certainly, quite a number of studies have explored images of Europe emerg-
ing from cross-cultural encounters. Yet in most cases, the historical agents under inves-
tigation were groups such as European travellers who, when interacting with different 
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world regions, were particularly prone to transgress national identities and express what 
in their eyes constituted the main contours of the European experience3. Comparatively 
few studies have investigated how Chinese, Latin American, Middle Eastern, and other 
historical agents conceptualized “the European” in direct encounters or in other relevant 
situations. 
It goes without saying that also in other parts of the world, tropes of “Europe” and the 
“European” played a significant role in intellectual, political, social and economic life. 
In many societies, it was particularly during the age of colonialism and imperialism that 
concepts such as “the European” came to acquire a meaning much larger than their eth-
nic or geographical connotations. They could be closely related to tropes surrounding 
topics ranging from colonial subjugation to prospects of liberty and national awakening. 
In that sense, the terms “Europe” and “the European” did often not point primarily to a 
distant world region but rather figured prominently in domestic debates about collective 
threats and possibilities4. For a long time, different political groupings in many parts of 
the world operated with peculiar images of “Europe” and the “European,” and they used 
them for their own purposes. Moreover, in many countries advocates of urgent change 
referred to a necessary, an unavoidable “Europeanization.”
Concepts such as “Europe” or the “European” were only part of much larger sets of 
images and semantic fields that were accompanying discourses of self-mobilization and 
impeding transformations. In many societies ranging from India to Korea, concepts such 
as the “European” were tied to terms such as “modernity,” “newness,” “civilization,” and 
even “technology.” In addition, the notion of “Europe” was not the only geographically 
defined term which figured prominently in the debates surrounding concepts such as 
modernity and civilization. Also concepts such as “the West” or stereotyped visions of 
single countries like Germany, France or Britain and their alleged national characters 
played an important role. How images of “the West” and Europe were related to each 
other in different societies and languages, has thus far been hardly assessed by modern 
research. The same is true for the associations between particular national stereotypes 
such as the Romantic Frenchman or the mercantile Englishman, and images of Europe 
at large. 
This article will certainly not be able to fill these rather wide research gaps. It will prima-
rily focus on visions of “Europe” and “the European” in the eyes of some groups of Chi-
nese scholars and students during the first two or three decades of the twentieth century, 
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specifically, I will compare images of Europe among some key protagonists of the “New 
Culture Movement” with voices who were more doubtful of what they interpreted as the 
key facets of European modernity. In this context, I will particularly focus on some Chi-
nese intellectuals who during and after the Great War argued that the idea of Europe as 
a global teaching civilization had taken a great hit. As I will further point out, these and 
other Chinese groups were actually in close contact with Europeans, and in many cases, 
Chinese images of “the European” actually emerged from transnational networks rather 
than constituting home-grown concepts and ideas. Before turning to the twentieth cen-
tury, however, I will provide a brief outlook of images of Europe that were circulating in 
seventeenth-century China. At that time, encounters between Chinese and Europeans 
were not yet framed by a colonial nexus of economic dominance and political suppres-
sion. In that sense, late Ming and early Qing images of Europe provide a good contrast 
foil in order to accentuate the implicit and explicit visions of world order in which Chi-
nese notions of Europe were situated during the early twentieth century. 
Some Chinese Images of Europe during the Seventeenth Century
During the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, China and Europe came into more 
sustained direct contacts with one another. These were not only confined to merchant 
transactions in a world in which naval trading routes started becoming longer and part 
of global networks of exchanges. Of great significance were also the new religious and 
scholarly exchanges between China and Europe as well as, more generally, the growing 
amount of information about one another on both sides of the Eurasian landmass. 
Jesuit missionaries who came in close contact with Confucian literati played an impor-
tant role in establishing high-level scholarly encounters between the Middle Kingdom 
and the West.5 In their effort to gain converts among the upper crust of Chinese society, 
Jesuit Fathers studied Mandarin as well as the Confucian classics. While for a long time 
academic research treated prominent Jesuits like Matteo Ricci as the sole creators of the 
so-called Jesuit “accommodation method” in China, reality was far more complex and 
interactive. In fact, the Confucian-Christian synthesis through which the Jesuits tried 
to find inroads into Chinese society (particularly its upper classes) was the result of a 
close collaboration between European missionaries and converted Chinese literati. Its 
overall structure was supposed to navigate between the manifold political and cultural 
constraints which existed on both the European and the Chinese side of this encounter. 
The main thrust of the accommodation approach was to interpret ancient Confucianism 
as a purely secular ethical system which, similarly to Greek philosophy in scholasticism, 
could be understood as a natural religion and hence was ultimately compatible with the 
revealed truth of Christianity. In principle, this approach could also be related to Confu-
5	 See	L.	Brockey,	Journey	to	the	East.	The	Jesuit	Mission	to	China,	59–24,	Cambridge	200.	
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cian reform movements which sought to return the alleged true teaching during the days 
of the master himself. 
In the pro-Christian literature during seventeenth-century China, images of “Europe” 
(at the time often transcribed as Ouluoba) were being disseminated in many parts of 
Chinese society. In the Chinese public, they found a rather receptive audience even out-
side of the circles of those individuals and families who had an interest in the Christian 
message per se. As a matter of fact, information about Europe and other parts of the 
world was much sought after in seventeenth-century China. For example, a Jesuit world 
map in Chinese, which was first published by Matteo Ricci in 1602, sold over eight edi-
tions within 25 years6. Similarly successful were books such as the Zhifang Waiji (Records 
of [the World] Outside (the Scope) of the Court Geographer), which was produced by the 
Jesuit missionary Giulio Aleni in 1623.7 Taking note of such tendencies, recent studies 
have departed even further from the stereotyped depiction of the Chinese literati elite 
as a culturally introverted upper class that had remained unchallenged by other internal 
and external forces.8
Nevertheless, in contrast to the twentieth century, the concepts of Europe and the Euro-
pean didn’t play a major role in the main political and cultural debates during the Ming-
Qing transition period. Rather, Europe and its peoples still mattered more as an object of 
a more general Chinese curiositas about other parts of the world. This is not to say, how-
ever, that the Jesuits’ geographical works and world maps primarily sought to cater to this 
more general interest within the educated Chinese public. Quite to the contrary, many 
seventeenth-century works published under the name of Jesuit missionaries or Chinese 
converts actually disseminated some highly idealized images of Europe9, and they did so 
in order to raise the appreciation of Christianity in parts of Chinese society.
For instance, the aforementioned Zhifang Waiji (Records of [the World] Outside [the 
Scope] of the Court Geographer) contain a lengthy depiction of Europe which portrays the 
continent in the Far West as a harbour of truth and peace, where no dynasty had fallen 
for a long time, where people did not need to lock their doors at night, and where no 
one would pick up lost money on the street. The text goes on to mention that the soil of 
Europe was fertile, the fauna rich, and nature’s overall resources so abundant that people 
could afford to live in palaces, wear precious clothes and eat only precious foods. Other 
pro-Christian texts portrayed the Jesuits as typical representatives of the European schol-
arly elite, and they did so by assigning them attributes of the ideal gentleman (junzi), a 
figure frequently evoked in the Confucian classics.
It seems somewhat ironic to read these accounts since they were published around the 
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lation of Central Europe. Still, such portraits of Europe in pro-Christian texts were more 
than simple inventions. In an extremely complex way, these images were themselves 
the products of negotiations between the Jesuits and their Chinese literati supporters as 
social groups from two different cultures who shared a common goal. For example, the 
aforementioned text segment of Aleni’s work in fact paraphrases a passage in a Confucian 
classic, namely the Book of Rites (Liji).10 This passage describes an allegedly ideal state 
of life in China during the time of the sage kings, which in the Confucian worldview 
figured as a symbol for the pristine times of China, before the onset of an overall moral 
decay set in which supposedly interrupted the proper transmission of the Way (Dao). 
Hence in the Zhifang Waiji, the image of Europe and the behaviour of the Europeans 
come close to a portrait of China during the supposedly lost Golden Age in early antiqui-
ty. If believed, such a depiction suggested that the revealed truth of God was actually the 
true and that Christianity was indeed the only teaching that could complement Confu-
cianism, restore its moral authority and hence lead China back to the long-lost, allegedly 
ideal social conditions of the ancient past. Some Chinese Christians, such as the local 
literati Zhu Zongyuan, a convert who died in 1660, directly contrasted this idealized 
vision of Europe with the moral, political, and social conditions in China and arrived at 
the conclusion that in all respects China fell short of the continent in the Far West.11 For 
example, in one of his works Zhu Zongyuan provides a whole list of comparisons, and 
in each and every one he ends with the provocative conclusion that compared to Europe, 
“the conditions in our China are not as good.” He finishes his chapter by stating that 
“if one regards the spirit and the habits of these people, I fear that it is not they who are 
the barbarians [but us].” Such words openly ran counter to Sino-centric currents of his 
time which tended to denigrate all peoples outside the Middle Kingdom as morally and 
culturally inferior.12 
Certainly, such arguments are indicative of the criticism the idealized images of Europe 
and the Europeans faced in seventeenth-century China.13 After all, calling a distant con-
tinent’s civilization superior was unusual and often even considered to be politically sub-
versive in the Chinese context. Moreover, a strong number of critics pointed to European 
colonialism on the Philippines and elsewhere in the region as well as, more generally, to 
the behaviour of some Europeans on Chinese soil. Still, idealizations of Europe and the 
Europeans based on Confucian claims were an important trope in the pro-Christian lit-
erature in late Ming China, just as similar idealizations of India had been rather common 
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In this context it is important to note that the image of European superiority could be 
entirely expressed though Chinese concepts. The standards of evaluation, which were 
necessary for comparing China and Europe as two civilizational realms, were entirely 
couched in a Confucian language. In many regards, the image of Europe in these pro-
Christian texts was at its core a geographical projection of Chinese ideals. Here Chris-
tianity was represented as the fulfilment of the trajectories of Confucianism; Europeans 
were being depicted as living under the same moral and ethico-political conditions as 
China had during its alleged long bygone golden age. In other words, in these portraits 
Confucianism’s cultural values and utopias were still taken as universal values. They were 
not yet part of programs to fundamentally change Confucian concepts, ideas, and ways 
of thinking about China and the world at large. Neither was there a notion that Confu-
cianism was somewhat parochial and not an expression of universal values.
The Early Twentieth Century
About two hundred years later, at the beginning of the twentieth century, the situa-
tion had changed dramatically.15 The new geopolitical and geo-cultural environment 
no longer allowed for a worldview defining China as a cultural star circled by minor 
satellites. It was not even possible for Chinese opinion makers to continue assuming that 
the former Middle Kingdom was a fully equal member in a new international world. A 
significant part of the Chinese elites regarded China not even as one among many na-
tion states but rather opined that its international standing had degraded to the position 
of a sleeping giant who was in danger of becoming colonized by technologically more 
advanced powers. A sense of an imminent and necessary historical discontinuity and of 
radical changes dominated many debates among Chinese politicians and intellectuals.16 
Even the staunchest defenders of a certain Chinese “cultural essence” did so increasingly 
in the spirit of mobilizing a counterforce against the overwhelming spirit of the time.
In contrast to the seventeenth century, many key agents on China’s political and intel-
lectual scene now saw their country as being endangered and confronted by a foreign 
civilization. In the eyes of many, the ever-growing presence of Western powers seemed to 
make it necessary to take over essential aspects of this new civilization. Japan, which was 
often regarded as a successful model of adapting “modernity” to an Asian context and 
started showing its own imperialist ambitions, was often interpreted along similar lines. 
Particularly after the crushing defeat in the Sino-Japanese War of 1894–1895, the voices 
of those grew stronger who demanded that China should follow similar self-transforma-
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In addition to this changing intellectual and political climate, Europeans were no 
longer rare visitors or restrained foreign dwellers in China; rather, their presence was 
growing significantly in the coastal cities, treaty ports, and even in the most remote 
hinterlands.17Moreover, due the series of unequal treaties starting from the Opium Wars, 
citizens of several European nations enjoyed legal privileges that clearly distinguished 
them – together with US-American and Japanese citizens – from the Chinese popula-
tions as well as almost all other foreign communities in China. Also, the living standards 
and technological facilities of many Europeans had started to clearly differentiate many 
European foreigners on Chinese soil from the vast majority of the Chinese population, 
including much of the country’s privileged classes. In addition, technologies that were 
at least partly associated with Europe changed China: steamships patrolled the Chinese 
rivers, railways crossed the land, and city-life started to change with daily newspapers,18 
international fashion, and even shopping malls. 
In a parallel process, new kinds and amounts of information about Europe and the Euro-
peans were becoming available within China’s rapidly changing public spheres. Foreign- 
and Chinese-owned schools offering education in fields such as English, engineering, or 
law mushroomed on Chinese soil during the decades around the turn of the twentieth 
century. As a consequence, Chinese society witnessed a strong growth of young intel-
lectual elite circles who had been primarily trained following a “modern” rather than a 
Confucian curriculum. In addition, many young professionals and students who had 
spent parts of their education overseas were becoming a more vociferous group in China. 
While Japan attracted the largest number of Chinese students19, most young intellectuals 
still self-identified primarily with Europe or the United States. Although Japan was often 
regarded as a successful non-Western modernizer, the growing Sino-Japanese antagonism 
certainly dwarfed the number of those who referred to Japan as a model for China’s fu-
ture. In this context, terms such as “Europe” or “the European” took a central place on 
the mental maps referred to in the debates.20
Nevertheless, not many serious advocates of “Westernization” in early twentieth-century 
China portrayed Europe and the United States solely as harbingers of personal freedom, 
global peace and joint human progress. In the eyes of many, one also needed to view 
the contemporary world through the perspectives of Social Darwinism. In the Chinese 
translation by the scholar Yan Fu, Social Darwinism appeared even more ruthless and 
merciless than in the original by Herbert Spencer.21 For Yan, the “survival of the fittest” 
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the East. The ambivalence of threat and promise, of attraction and estrangement, which 
characterized the Chinese upper and middle classes’ perceptions of the ongoing trans-
formations, made it no longer possible to sustain the traditional Confucian education 
system: it was abolished in 1905. 
From the beginning, the increasing outward orientation of numerous Chinese intellectu-
als was accompanied by decidedly critical attitudes towards Chinese history and tradi-
tion. As a positive or negative benchmark for China, the term “Europe” was used rather 
interchangeably with “the West” (xifang), “modernity” (xiandai or jinshi) or with “Eu-
roAmerica” (Oumei), a Chinese synthesis of the main characters of the Chinese terms for 
“Europe” and “America.” For example, in one of his many articles for the journal New 
Youth (Xin Qingnian), a key forum of the New Culture Movement, its founder Chen 
Duxiu expressed this widely shared sentiment among urban students in the following 
way: 
There are two radically different types of culture in the world: The Oriental cultures and 
the Occidental cultures. In essence [the Oriental cultures] have not moved out of the 
ancient traces of civilization, therefore they are the remains of old civilization. What 
can be really called modern culture is the Occidental culture uniquely possessed by the 
Europeans; it is known as European and Western culture. … The Western culture pos-
sesses characteristics that are radically different from those of the ancient cultures and give 
people a sense of freshness.22 
Also for Chen the terms “modern culture,” “Occidental culture,” “Western culture,” and 
“European culture” were closely related if not even identical with each other. Clearly he 
mainly attributed this culture to Europe by stating that it is “uniquely possessed by the 
Europeans.” While in his writings he certainly included the United States into the orbit 
of modern Western civilization, he obviously defined Europe as the origin and epicentre 
of a civilization whose “freshness” left older cultural patterns behind. In that sense, also 
the “European” had become far more than a citizen of Europe in Chen’s account: he 
or she figured as the representative of a dynamic civilization which had its attractions 
while at the same time posing an imperialist threat to China as a polity, economy and 
culture. 
In another article, Chen argued that Western culture cherished freedom and self-expres-
sion, whereas Oriental culture was hierarchical and authoritarian, and that while West-
ern technology was continuously pushing for new territories, Oriental culture would aim 
at preserving the status quo. He drew the conclusion that if China did not overcome its 
ancient civilization, it was doomed to disappear from history. Noting his highly critical 
attitude towards Chinese culture, one should pay attention to some of the key concepts 
with which Chen Duxiu evaluated the alleged shortcomings of China. Positing Chinese 
or Oriental culture as polar opposites of Western dynamism and the forceful character 
22	 Chen	Duxiu,	The	French	and	Modern	Civilization,	in:	Xin	Qingnian		(95).	
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of Europeans and Americans, his method of evaluating China’s backwardness emanated 
from his specific interpretation of “the West.” In Chen’s portraits, China appeared to be 
a suppressive apparatus stifling creativity and individual fulfilment, thus paralyzing the 
society as a whole. Europe and the Europeans figured as an essential part of a “West” 
which Chen saw as dynamic on an individual and on a collective level. 
Also the Great War, which certainly was quite a publicized event in Chinese newspa-
pers,23 did not significantly change the attitudes of most New Culture Movement pro-
tagonists to what they defined as Chinese customs and traditions.24 A closer look at some 
journals such as New Youth (Xin Qingnian), Eastern Miscellaneous (Dongfang Zazhi), or 
Young China (Shaonian Zhongguo) reveals that many authors continued referring to the 
alleged superiority of Europeans when making postulates for a new China. For example, 
in an article written for Shaonian Zhongguo in 1921, Wei Shizhen, who had recently 
travelled in Europe, compared the Europeans and the Chinese in the following way: 
The Europeans are big and well-built while the Chinese are extremely small. The Euro-
peans are energetic while the Chinese are lethargic. Without mentioning other aspects, 
the physical difference alone can doom the Chinese to fail when they compete with the 
Europeans. Thus, if the Chinese are seeking to fight for survival, trying to improve our 
race becomes an important task.25
In the same article, he continued praising the positive effects of European life, marriage 
patterns, and different methods of education as well as even baby care. This led him to 
the conclusion that China needed to adopt such aspects of European culture if it wanted 
to grow stronger. Along similar lines, Hua Lu interpreted the Great War more or less 
as a confirmation of European superiority in a world governed by warfare and strug-
gle. As late as 1924, he argued that the war had heightened national sentiments among 
Europeans, which is why it rallied whole nations to stand together, providing them with 
the necessary strength to survive in a merciless world.26 According to others, the West 
remained superior because of its revolutionary energy, its individual commitment, and 
its scientific, progressive culture that generated material advantages. For example, in the 
liberal camp, intellectuals such as Hu Shi, Cai Yuanpei,27 or lesser-known figures like Tao 
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the war as the triumph of democracy and cooperative internationalism over militarism, 
authoritarianism and imperialism.28 
In any case, hardly any advocate of the New Culture Movement aimed at Westerniza-
tion in the sense of China mimicking European or Euro-American civilization. Most 
of the movement’s main advocates opined that China needed to find its own way to 
modernity but that it would need to do so after an inevitable process of profound cul-
tural self-criticism and civilizational learning. In the eyes of many key thinkers of the 
New Culture Movement or the May Fourth Movement, Western civilization was only 
partly the outcome of old European traditions. Rather, Western civilization was first and 
foremost conceptualized as the outcome of a historical rupture which, based on modern 
individualism and scientism, had left earlier traditional constraints behind. In a certain 
sense, they demanded that China learn from what they regarded as Europe’s historical 
discontinuities rather than its cultural continuities in the sense of traditions. 
For key figures of the New Culture Movement like Chen Duxiu it was particularly the 
realm of mores, norms, values and behavioural patterns which impeded China from 
transforming itself into a modern society. For him, individualism and other alleged be-
havioural principles of modern European societies were foundational to building modern 
and future-oriented countries. Others were more doubtful about referring to European 
mores, ethics and socio-political values as inspirational examples for China. For example, 
in an article for the journal Young China (Shaonian Zhongguo), one of its regular con-
tributors, Shen Yi, wrote the following thoughts from his travels in Europe: 
Since I am abroad I realize that there is no other nation in the world as good as the 
Chinese in regards to morality, tolerance, and love for others. … Following these great 
qualities we should be able to contribute to the coming of world peace. The others might 
be awakened, the path towards the future might still be unpaved, but I firmly believe 
that the day will come when our nation will be able to demonstrate its own ability and 
to achieve its ideals.29
The discourse of a Chinese moral superiority was particularly prominent in the camp 
of scholars who advocated more cautious paths to modernity,30 which would be based 
more on continuities than on discontinuities. For this group, which stood somewhat 
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prominent topos.31 For them, the disasters in Europe revealed that some often idealized 
facets of European modernity carried not only promises but also dangers and destruc-
tive potentials. In fact, some major figures of the Chinese intellectual scene such as Yan 
Fu and Liang Qichao who certainly had been advocates of national self-strengthening 
programs, now viewed the European experience as a Faustian process that had gotten out 
of control.32 Rather openly they interpreted the war as the end of a misguided European 
trajectory. Consequently for them, the Europeans of today could no longer symbolize 
the world of tomorrow; rather, the East of yesterday could help the Europe of today. 
Like many others, they started to emphasize that China needed to preserve some of its 
cultural heritage and even cultivate some of its traditional core values. 
Quite a substantial number of intellectuals belonging to this camp were able to acquire 
personal impressions of Europe in the years after 1918. Some of them were visiting 
scholars at European universities, whereas others were students or diplomatic delegates. 
The historian and public intellectual Liang Qichao and the philosopher Zhang Junmai 
(otherwise known as Carson Chang), for example, were among the cultural delegates of 
the Chinese mission at the negotiations in Versailles. During their stay, both travelled 
extensively through various countries and met European intellectuals such as Romain 
Rolland, René Guénon, or Rudolf Eucken. Zhang Junmai was actually so impressed 
by the parallels between Eucken’s and his own work that he decided to stay in Jena for 
several years in order to work on several common projects. Zhang and Eucken even co-
authored the book, The Problem of Life in China and Europe, which was published in 
Germany and in China.33 Like other works by Zhang Junmai and by Rudolf Eucken, 
this joint publication advocated a continued modernization and yet, at the same time, it 
warned of blindly following the British and the American way. It depicted both nations 
as unwilling to accept any alternative approaches to modernity, and on this basis, it called 
for German idealism and Chinese traditionalism to join forces. Since both authors were 
careful to distinguish between Anglo-Saxon and German nationhood, the term “Europe” 
did not figure in a foundational way in their philosophical system. 
After his return to China, Zhang Junmai followed up on his intellectual agenda. In later 
writings such as My Political Impressions During my Stay in Europe From 1919–1921 
(1919 zhi 1921 nian lü Ouzhou zhi zhengzhi yinxiang),34 he warned of blindly Europe-
anizing China and argued that Europeans now, after having suffered heavy blows, had 
to learn from the civilizations of the East. A similar change of opinions can be observed 
in the case of Liang Qichao. In his historical writings produced before World War I, 
3	 J.	Osterhammel,	Shanghai,	30.	Mai	925.	Die	chinesische	Revolution,	München	99.	
32	 See	for	example	Tang,	Xiaobing,	Global	Space	and	the	Nationalist	Discourse	of	Modernity:	The	Historical	Thin-






112 | Dominic Sachsenmaier
the great thinker had depicted the basic patterns of the European past as a trajectory of 
innovations and transformations, both at a social and a cultural level. In comparison to 
the culture of the Europeans, Liang had argued then, China was not only rather stagnant 
and isolated – it was also stricken by blindness, since it could not even recognize the 
common human progress emanating from its epicentre in the West.35 He added that 
while a mature sociopolitical culture enabled Europeans to sustain modern states and 
civil societies, the Chinese masses would have to be led slowly towards a culture of liber-
alism and socially responsible individualism. At the same time, Liang was weary of being 
too naive about the possibility of a shortcut to European modernity. 
After returning home from his travels in Europe from 1919–1920, during which he 
visited several countries (among them England, France, and Germany), Liang published 
a book under the title Impressions of Travels in Europe (Ouzhou xinying lu), which is di-
vided into two parts.36 The first one, Europe before and after the Great War, contains an 
account of his travels in Europe and delivers an analysis of the conditions he observed. 
The second one, The Self-Awakening of the Chinese People, outlines the implications of 
the new geopolitical constellation for China and its future course. In the first part, Liang 
provided some rather graphical accounts of how European living conditions had deterio-
rated during the war. For example, he described his arrival in London in the following 
way: As soon as we landed, nothing but images of poverty and destruction opened in front of 
our eyes. 
Liang goes on to recount that despite the winter season, his hotel room had no heat, and 
that during breakfast sugar was so precious that the Chinese delegation to which he be-
longed had to negotiate with only half-empty stomachs at best. Already, these images of 
hunger and despair in a Chinese description of Europe indicated a revision of an other-
wise dominant trope: European superiority in fields like technology and living standards 
was obviously no longer given. In the same text, he asks his readership: 
Who could have imagined [before the war] that America would be able to take charge on 
the other side of the Atlantic and who would have expected that European countries and 
their populations would suffer the fate of poverty as we do? And who could have imag-
ined those wealthy English, French, and Germans would also start crying out about their 
poverty and in their lives would start depending on high-interest loans?37
There was a certain reversal of international hierarchies in Liang’s account – Europeans 
as the formerly privileged part of the global population had sunken down to the state of 
the disadvantaged ones. In a similar way, one can understand Liang’s detailed discussions 
of widespread pessimism among European intellectuals. He actually regarded the overall 
dark cultural and intellectual mood among European thinkers as a more severe symptom 
35	 See	for	example	Tang,	Xiaobing,	Global	Space	and	the	Nationalist	Discourse	of	Modernity:	The	Historical	Thin-
king	of	Liang	Qichao.	Stanford	99
3	 Liang	Qichao,	Ouyou	xinying	lu	jielu	[Thoughts	about	My	Travels	 in	Europe],	 in:	 idem,	Yinbingshi	heji		(repr.	
Beijing	989).
3	 Ouyou	Xinying	lu,	p.	299.
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of crisis than material shortage or war destructions. For him, Europe was a continent out 
of breath, yet still looking desperately for a new direction. Before the war, he had always 
praised Europe’s endless resources of ambitious energies, its continuous endeavour to 
discover the new and unknown as a major advantage over China.
In his following reflections, Liang problematized Europe’s fate from different angles, 
though all of these angles led back to a common line of interpretation – a dynamic 
process that had gotten out of control. According to Liang, Europe’s revolutionary rest-
lessness (which he had praised before) was now in the process of dissecting itself into a 
multitude of national and class-related protest movements, which in essence meant that 
the revolutionary energy had started to turn against itself. He added that it was mainly 
this modern belief in systematic scientific doubts that had robbed Europeans of their 
spiritual strongholds. He further stated that the consequences of a scientific culture such 
as industrialization, urbanization, and proletarization had eaten away the communal 
spirit among European residents. In this context he wrote: 
As a result of the development of science, the organization of industrial production un-
derwent fundamental innovations. Changes were carried out at such a fast speed, with 
such a sudden force, and on such a large scale, that people were always and everywhere at 
a loss when they tried to make agree their inner life with their outer life.38
In the Impressions of Travels in Europe, such passages are flanked by descriptions of the 
social fragmentation of European cities, the growing gaps not only between the social 
classes, but also between urban and rural areas. For Liang, the consequences of these 
bundled yet extremely contradictory forces were the spread of Social Darwinism on all 
levels, especially among social classes, religions, and nations. Like revolutionary energy, 
Liang had previously admired the implicit cultural logics of Social Darwinism as a major 
cultural force behind Europe’s success. 
For Liang Qichao, the rest of the world could no longer learn from the Europeans in a 
holistic manner; rather they now also needed to draw important lessons from Europe’s 
crisis. This meant that the status of countries such as China as a latecomer in modern de-
velopment now became at least partly an advantage, a possibility of steering a changing 
society into more stable directions. Differing from advocates of the New Culture Move-
ment, Liang held that the main indigenous elements, which China needed to maintain 
or even revitalize, were particularly some of its key values and communal ties. In his eyes, 
these supposed features of Chinese civilization had the potential to enrich a modern 
culture based on pure scientism, instrumental reason and progress-oriented mentalities. 
Through such a synthesis, the forces of modern dynamism would be prevented from 
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Still, Liang did not simply prophesy the decline of Europe and the Europeans. By con-
trast, he predicted that European culture would eventually turn around and approach a 
more cautious, humble, and gentle form of modernity. It would eventually learn to listen 
to the voices of softer and more moderate cultures. Within this intellectual framework, 
Europe had not only been dethroned as the only teaching civilization but was placed in 
the role of the student. Liang Qichao theorized rather extensively about the potential 
contributions of Chinese values to help Europe rediscover and recreate a stable sociopo-
litical culture. Such thoughts provided the background for appeals, such as the following 
call to Chinese students: 
Our beloved youth! Please pay attention! March on! On the other side of the great land-
mass, in Europe, millions are suffering from the bankruptcy of material culture and are 
desperately calling for help. They are waiting for you to come and save them. 
In passages of this kind, Europeans certainly no longer figured as the representatives of 
a teaching civilization that had shaken the fundaments of all other cultures around the 
world. Rather, in Liang’s account it was now the Europeans who had to face the stark 
choice between a major civilizational change and disaster – a situation that in principle 
did not differ from the one in which many critical Chinese thinkers saw their own 
country. 
Conclusion
At any stage of history, there was not one monolithic Chinese image of Europe and the 
Europeans. The perceptions of the continent in the Far West differed between various 
social, political, and intellectual actors, and as images they were embedded within wider 
worldviews, value-systems and sociopolitical agendas.
One of the key differences between the discussed images of Europeans during the sev-
enteenth century and the early twentieth century was their underlying notions of nor-
mativity, universality and interpretational authority. During the seventeenth century, 
both Chinese Christians and Jesuit missionaries expressed the alleged achievements of 
European civilizations in Confucian terms. Consequently, in the pro-Christian literature 
of that time the moral and social qualities of Europeans were being depicted in a manner 
that openly referred to China’s mythical golden age as it was described in the Confucian 
classics. 
By contrast, during the early twentieth century pro-Westernization forces operated on 
the assumption that Europe formed the heart of a modern, allegedly universalizable 
modern culture. In many Chinese accounts from that time period, Europeans tended to 
figure as the representatives of an advanced world, and their ideas as well as social values 
were often seen as paradigmatic for China’s future. For other camps of thinkers dur-
ing the aftermath of World War I, however, the notion of universality looked far more 
problematic and at the same time far less desirable. Many prominent Chinese thinkers 
regarded the war as the failure of the Enlightenment program and forcefully maintained 
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that Europeans now had to learn how to learn from other civilizations. In their eyes, 
it was particularly some ethical standards and social principles which China needed to 
preserve rather than overcome. However, also thinkers like Liang Qichao, Zhang Jun-
mai or Yan Fu were not inimical to the idea of changing China, and they operated with 
terms and concepts that were an integral part of China’s modernization discourses of 
that time. However, their views differed from many key protagonists of the New Culture 
Movement in what they identified as the necessary realms and scopes of China’s future 
transformations. 
All of the perceptions of Europeans that I discussed were not generated in a solipsistic 
manner but were rather disseminated and partly created by translocal communities of 
likeminded people. This was the case with the Jesuits and their elite converts in Ming-
Qing China, and the same was true during the beginning of the twentieth century when 
Chinese visions of radical modernization were closely tied to globally circulating intel-
lectual currents and political programs. As I have argued elsewhere in more detail, many 
“Chinese” reactions to World War I were also at least partly the products of transnational 
intellectual networks that included a significant number of prominent European think-
ers.39
Today, the background of Chinese perceptions of Europeans is very different. Long gone 
are the days when Europe would still be considered the centre of global modernity and a 
key reference space for intellectual and political debates in China. In the past thirty years 
it was particularly the United States which figured in the latter role. During that same 
time period, however, the Chinese intellectual climate has changed. More voices are 
now calling for a „Chinese model“ as a unique and particularly promising path. In this 
context, many groups have come to challenge the idea of any Western reference space for 
China’s debates about its domestic future and international roles. Rather, problematizing 
global hierarchies of knowledge and the West’s epistemological dominance has come to 
be an important element in many academic and intellectual debates in contemporary 
China. 
39	 D.	Sachsenmaier,	Searching	For	Alternatives	to	Western	Modernity.	Cross-Cultural	Approaches	in	the	Aftermath	
of	World	War	I,	in:	Journal	of	Modern	European	History	4	(200),	2,	pp.	24-259;	and	idem,	Alternative	Visions	of	
World	Order	in	the	Aftermath	of	World	War	I	–	Global	Perspectives	on	Chinese	Approaches	(see	note	24).	Parts	
of	this	article	are	based	on	these	two	publications.
